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One of the aims of social theory in religion has been to explore 
axiomatically and theoretically the social and cultural dimensions of the 
realm of the sacred. The work of Emile Durkheim has been pre-eminent in 
this task. Critical feminist theory has however detailed the ways in which 
Durkheimian accounts of religion have been heavily gendered, and the 
sacred masculinized. Feminist theories of religion have responded to this 
by positing a re-casting of the relationship between gender and divinity. 
One of the central problematics in this field of enquiry is whether to reclaim 
the profane as the site of resistance and biophillia1 and from which to 
center women s religious agency; or to re-claim the sacred as the primary 
site for the construction of an ethics of sexual difference and gendered 
identity. This essay is an initial consideration of this problematic with 
particular reference to the social conditions of religion in post-modernity. 
'I feel areal urgency to elaborate alternative accounts, to learn to think differently 
about the subject, to invent new frameworks, new images, new modes of thought'. 
Rosi Braidotti 
Religion is what makes "man". Victoria Lee Erickson (1993:23) 
Re-thinking the Sacred 
One way of reading Durkheim's account of the sacred in his text Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life ( 197 6) is to consider it as an examination of the relationship 
between the social construction of the sacred and gender relations. While Durkheim 
himself may not have intended his analysis to be a critical account of gender and 
religion, such a reading is clearly sustainable, and useful in generating an account of 
the social processes through which the sacred becomes masculinised. Several feminist 
scholars have provided critical interpretive paradigms on the work ofDurkheim (Bell, 
1983; Erickson, 1993; Jay, 1992), and suggested various responses to his account of 
the enculturation of sacredness with masculinity. This paper considers these responses, 
especially in light of the assertion by feminist philosophers Luce Irigaray and Grace 
Jantzen, that an essential condition of women's [authentic] subjecthood, is access to 
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a particularized feminine sacred. The urgency of this task is not just about theoretical 
issues: numerous scholars2 have argued that the foundation of the sacred - in both 
modern and pre-modern societies- rests on the idea, and practice, of violent sacrifice. 
Feminist scholars have argued that the violence which generates the sacred- and 
produces the profane- is substantially and historically, masculinised (Erickson, 1993; 
Jay, 1993; Magee, 1994). Recent global events implicate religion in practices and 
systems that are violent and destructive and so a re-positioning of the sacred into 
more regenerative and productive forms is an essential and urgent task for humanity 
in creating a sustainable planet and compassionate society. 
Feminism and the Secular 
One indubitably writes against the master discourse of the secular which thus 
positions one on the margins of what constitutes "acceptable" knowledge about 
the social world (Magee, 1995:117). 
Understandably, the second wave feminist movement in the West, has been 
characterised by a strong declaration that religion and religious institutions, are primary 
sources of women's oppression. Women's limited citizenship in church communities 
has been well documented, and change progresses slowly in most major religions. 
However, unlike other social institutions, many western feminists considered religion 
as hopelessly and essentially patriarchal and therefore unworthy of revolutionary 
attention. It made more sense for the majority of women, particularly in the 1970s 
and 1980s, to walk away from religion and accept the more transparent and flexible 
systems of secularism, which appeared responsive to programs of reform and feminist 
ideologies. Women who remained in religious communities were thus at odds with 
secular feminism, although they continued to bring feminist agendas and reform 
programs to church institutions in a solid belief that such institutions were indeed 
capable of responding to ideas of gender equality (see Tulip & McPhillips, 1998). 
During the 1990s, [secular] feminist scholarship began to reconsider religion, 
and social theory to reconsider the thesis of secularization (Lyon, 2000:20-35). The 
movement in feminist scholarship was partly due to the influence of postmodern 
paradigms ofknowledge and a collective search for non-rationalized sources of cultural 
meaning, and largely the impact of the emergence of a strong discipline of feminist 
theology and feminist studies in religion which resulted in new ways to conceptualize 
gender and religion, and which drew attention to the question of women's subjectivity 
and the conditions which would foster the liberation of her identity from patriarchal 
norms. Within this, a strong critique of secularism developed. Indeed, feminist scholars 
such as Penny Magee (1993), Grace Jantzen (1998) and Luce Irigaray, (1993), have 
argued that it is dangerous to embody an identity or sociality that resolutely calls 
itself 'secular', because to do so both ascribes to andre-inscribes the masculinised 
sacred in secular guise. Grace Jantzen says : 
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As Irigaray reminds us, there is strategic value in rethinking religion rather than 
in acqueising in an already masculinized secularism, not "awaiting the god 
passively, but bringing the god to life through us" ... Contrary to much secular 
feminist thought, Irigaray is clear that religion cannot just be ignored or written 
off: it has to be transformed because it is in the symbolic of religion, and in 
particular, the idea of God, that a horizon for becoming exists and makes possible, 
authentic human subjectivity (1998:275). 
Also arguing the dangers of secularism, Penny Magee ( 199 5: 117) stated that in 
ignoring the sacred, secular feminism acquieses to the sacred/profane distinction as a 
totalising, violent opposition: 
'We must avoid setting up adversarial positions which invoke, by means of 
Absence, traditional metaphysical certainties. 'Fear of the God question, fear of 
'divine women' and fear of their irrelevance to 'empirical reality' can only 
maintain constraints that reinforce the ideology of the sacred-profane 'opposition'. 
For Magee, m~y theoretical separation between the secular and the sacred 
operates clearly in the interests of a masculinized religiosity and fragments the project 
of liberation and subjectivity: 
Traditional philosophers, theologians and clergy have already achieved much 
success keeping the sacred and the profane (as defmed by them) at war with one 
another, and we know who are the colonized. Feminism should not sell arms to 
the combatants. (1995:117) 
Magee, lrigaray and Jantzen all argue that religion is not an 'optional extra' on 
the social scene: rather, it is an essential formation of social life and identity and as 
such requires special attention. In the late nineteenth century Durkheim, and other 
social thinkers, came to a similar conclusion. The radical nature of this idea - that 
religion makes human culture possible - was appreciated significantly by 
anthropological accounts of traditional cultures but much less so by sociological 
accounts ofwestern cultures which had accepted that modernity signified the demise 
of religion as both institution and belief system. However, Durkheim's account of 
religion remains important, because it provides a substantial explanation of how 
religion functions as the authorisation of cultural life through the central positioning 
of the realm of the sacred. With recent evidence by social theorists such as David 
Lyons (2000), documenting post-modernity as inclusive of a return to religious 
sensibilities and the formation of new religious practices, it is becoming clear that 
western cultures are engaged in processes of de-secularisation, and specifically re-
defining andre-imagining the sacred.3 The question one needs to consider is: what 
are the gendered dimensions of these new or revitalised religious forms? In Durkheim 's 
account of the sacred this is a socio-symbolic space which is defmed by, and available 
only for, men. The question for feminist theory is: is it possible to engender a sacred 
that can be representative of woman? Of sexual difference? To consider this question, 
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I tum first to feminist critiques of the masculinized sacred. 
The Masculinized Sacred 
For a long time it has been known that the first systems of representations with 
which men have pictured to themselves the world and themselves were of 
religious origin. There is no religion that is not a cosmology at the same time 
that it is a speculation upon divine things ... Men owe to it not only a good part 
of the substance of their knowledge, but also the form in which this knowledge 
has been elaborated. (Durkheim, 1915:9) 
The association of gender with the profane is notorious (Magee, 1995:109). 
Religion is the way in which masculine identity is sacralised (Erickson, 1993:48) 
According to Durkheim, the primary function of religion is to provide social 
cohesion and collective identity. The way in which this is established is through the 
classification of all material and non-material realities into two categories: the profane 
and sacred, which are then managed by a community (church) as sets of beliefs and 
rites. Thus the foundation of human society can be said to be religious, in the sense 
that religion is defmed by the distinctiveness of this particular classificatory system. 
The function of myths, stories, dogmas and beliefs is to produce a system of 
representations which express 'the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers 
which are attributed to them, or their relations with each and with profane things' 
(Durkheim, 1915:37). As Erickson (1993:5) puts it: 
People in everyday life think about things real and ideal, and it is through religion 
(a set of beliefs and rites) that they categorize things (real and ideal) as sacred 
and profane ... Religion, then, is a way of knowing and thinking about reality. 
The forms of reality that are produced by such a system of classification are far 
reaching, according to Durkheim. Notions of time, space, ways of understanding 
difference, social meaning and individual identity, rely on the on-going generation of 
sacredness (Erickson, 1993 :5). But for the sacred to exist and exert social force, there 
must also exist the de-sacralized realm from which identity and sociality must be 
protected: 
Sacralization is a "fluid process" that seeks to cover and protect its base identity: 
that is, the core of social knowledge, understanding, and agreement that secures 
its survival. (Erickson 1993:5) · 
This realm of the de-sacralized constitutes the profane: its base function is to 
stand in as the antithesis of sacredness, as the necessary 'other' in a system of dualistic 
classification (Erickson, 1993: 12). Women's association with the profane means that 
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the feminine is characterised entirely by what is left after men have constituted the 
sacred so that 'Women and men are gendered at that point in time when the sacred 
and profane world come into being' (Erickson, 1993:48). This understanding of the 
gendered nature of the sacred is re-iterated by several theorists of religion who followed 
Durkheim including Freud, Otto and Eliade and Douglas (Erickson, 1993:56-61). It 
could be argued that in social theory, it amounted to the produption of a normative 
representation of the sacred. 
Durkheim makes an extraordinary contribution to understanding the 
phenomenon of the sacred in posing the necessity of sacred and profane realms to 
human culture, and the various cultural forces that are required to manage these 
powerful realms. Gender relations are produced and managed within these realms 
but rather than imposing an absolutist relationship between gender and the sacred, 
Durkheim proposes a certain reflexivity around such gender boundaries, evidenced 
where he says women are not essentially profane (Durkheim, 1976: 138)- it is only in 
relation to men and the sacred that such a politics is made possible. So although 
Durkheim's reading of Arunta ceremonies of initiation locates women as symbolic 
and embodied representatives of the profane, where young boys must leave their 
mothers and sisters in order to become men, it is the social defmition of the sphere 
that determines citizenship, and not essentialised innate, characteristics. 
Durkheim also acknowledges and is interested in boundary crossing and slippage 
between the two spheres. After all, people live in both worlds (Erickson, 1993:12). 
There must be moments of liminality at play between the spheres, and as Turner 
(1969:166-7), drawing on the work ofVan Gennep, argues, liminality is a key factor 
in ritual life which moderates in function and [symbolic and embodied] space, the 
relationship between the two spheres. Where ritual strategically creates liminality, it 
allows passage across spheres. The importance of understanding the power of the 
connection between religion and the (masculine) sacred, is that as Geertz (1975) 
argues, religion creates a cultural ethos and world views which establish normative 
social values, experienced by individuals in rituals as feelings and motivations. And 
as Turner argues, the function of liminality is that in dissolving border rigidities, it 
creates a potential for 'a period of scrutinisation of the central values and axioms of 
the culture in which it occurs' (Turner, 1969:167, also argued by Bell, 1993:248). 
This provides us with a theory of the generation of patriarchal society and its symbolic 
cosmos, and it also explains how feminist responses are possible, but it does not 
adequately explain Durkheim's insistence on the complete alterity between the two 
realms. 
For Durkheim the sacred and profane are completely separate worlds: they 
have nothing in common. They cannot share time or space and the function of ritual 
is to ensure they never meet and cause deep disruption. Religion belongs to the sacred; 
magic to the profane.4 They are barely comparable. However, culture spans the two 
worlds and people live in both, thus there are rituals for managing separation, and 
border crossing is required constantly. Durkheim (1976:39-40) demonstrates that in 
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Arunta society the initiation rites for young men involve the leaving of the profane 
world of the mother and the everyday, and the entering of a new sacred society where 
he is given a new identity and social place. Erickson ( 1993:21) argues that: 
In the Elementary Forms to be a man requires the exclusion of women from 
social life. By sacralising the masculine community and denigrating the feminine, 
men become social and women natural beings. Reread, Durkheims' work outlines 
the exclusion of women from the ideal world as a given activity of social life. 
One of the functions of the sacred is to generate power. Power is created by the 
force necessary to maintain complete heterogeneity between the sacred and the profane. 
In this sense, power can be understood as a function of religious experience in the 
sense that force is a natural requirement for maintenance of the separation of spheres. 
Hence the idea of force is itself religious because the force isolating the sacred from 
the profane lives in the minds of the believers (Erickson 1993:22). Religious force 
(the force of collective opinion) creates a collective force (from a membership that 
upholds the sacred by means of violence) used to legitimate a matrix of domination 
and subordination, clearly visible in the processes that gender social life. Erickson 
( 1993 :23) argues that without this concept of sacralising force, Durkheim would have 
no theory of social life: 
Durkheim reduced religion to collective life; yet behind religion lies the will to 
exclude the profane, the feminine. Religion is further reducible to exclusive 
groups that dominate the excluded. Religion is the mechanism through which 
this exclusion is ensured. Religion is what makes "man". 
Erickson (1993:23) presents an important idea here: that it is religion that is 
'the primary supporter of gender and gendered power created in the collective 
conscience of men'. Seen in this light, the insistence of second wave feminism that 
religion is essentially patriarchal is insightful. However, as Magee demonstrates, 
secularism does not undo the relationship between the sacred and violence: indeed it 
tends to veil it and in doing so subtly encourages its continuation. Secularisation 
then, is not an answer to unraveling the connection between male violence and female 
subordination. 
However, secularism does express a de-centering of the importance of tradition, 
religion and religious rites, particularly in modernity. This is argued by social theorists 
such as Max Weber (1993) and Anthony Giddens (1991). Durkheim argued that 
secularisation does not necessarily mean that religion as a process of classification is 
lost: indeed he argues in modernity that religion and the sacred is transformed, but 
still visible in the need for sociality and a collective life. Erickson agrees in the sense 
that the sacredness of masculinity is continually reproduced as the form of ultimate 
human expression. 
Recent considerations of contemporary forms of religion (Lyons, 2000; Tacey, 
2000) have identified a strong cultural shift towards are-enchantment of the public 
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sphere and valorization of [new] public expressions of the sacred. Without doubt, 
there are multiple dimensions to this phenomenon and various sites where such 
practices are identifiable. The New Age in particular, provides one of the clearest 
expressions of a de-secularising west. This raises important questions for the sociology 
of religion and in particular the need for methods that are able to identify expressions 
of the sacred in post-modern cultures. Questions emerge including: how to identify 
and understand the sacred in contemporary cultural forms? How do processes of 
distinction between sacred and profane work? Are contemporary expressions of 
religiosity bound by gender dichotomies? While numerous social and cultural theorists 
have taken up the issue of new cultural expressions of the sacred, feminist theorists 
such as Luce Irigaray, Grace Jantzen, Penny Magee and Momy Joy continue to argue 
that a central task of contemporary feminist scholarship is to disrupt the universality 
of the masculinist symbolic, and explore new imaginaries of divinity and sexual 
difference. 
Re-imagining the Sacred and the Feminine Symbolic 
If she is to become woman, if she is to accomplish her female subjectivity, woman 
needs a god who is a figure for the perfection of her subjectivity (Jrigaray, Divine 
JVomen) . 
. Erickson challenges Durkheim's claim that the collective religious experience 
is representative. She argues ( 1993: 10-11) that 'the sacred is gendered masculine and 
the profane is gendered feminine' which carries with it an implicit understanding of 
violence against women: 'Therefore it is possible to hypothesize that what produced 
'religion' was not a collective experience but a masculine one, and that what Durkheim 
"saw" when he looked at religion was activity produced primarily to satisfy the needs 
of men.' More than this, Erickson (1993:49) argues that Durkheim fundamentally 
under-theorised the profane realm, by allowing the sacred to define its alterity. So 
although he produced a theory of sexual difference, it was one predicated on the 
feminine as non-masculine (and therefore non-sacred). 
This is the same conclusion that Luce Irigaray has come to in her analysis of 
the relationship between the formation of identity and gender. Beginning with Lacan's 
thesis on individuation, Irigaray argues that subjectivity must be achieved- it is not 
simply given: 
What Jrigaray demonstrates is that the subject which Lacan and Freud describe, 
who achieves subjectivity and sexual maturity through the repression of 
competing desires in the formation of the unconscious, is male. For Freud, the 
feminine is defmed by lack; a little girl is a little boy without a penis. Lacan 
speaks of woman as the "not all". So it is the male for whom subjectivity is 
possible. Irigaray then asks: can women be subjects? Can women achieve 
subjectivity as women, not becoming one of the boys? Becoming who we are in 
our own right, rather than defined in relation to men. (Jantzen 1997: 193) 
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Erickson asks the same question in relation to Durkheim. How can women 
gain access to the sacred? Without becoming mimetics of male violence? While both 
Durkheim andLacan can explain the lack of women's subjectivity, they cannot explain 
how women can gain subjectivity, outside of a male symbolic. For both Irigaray and 
Erickson the starting point is silence, to consider the gaps where women cannot speak, 
or at least where their voices cannot be heard in the masculine symbolic. Irigaray 
argues that Freud and Lacan described women's exclusion as silence, but failed to 
explore the details of these sites. Erickson argues the same about Durkheim. The 
question of subjectivity for women outside the male symbolic is the question: neither 
theorist is interested in 'women becoming subjects in the old masculinist "economy 
of the same" ... ' (Jantzen, 1998:11). However, Irigaray and Erickson come to very 
different conclusions regarding where subjectivity might be located and negotiated, 
and the possibilities of re-juvenating the sacred. 
Erickson argues (1993:188) that it is to the realm of the profane that women 
must tum to in search of life affirming spiritualities and justice for marginalised 
groups. Durkheim was unable to theorise the profane beyond the notion that it 
constituted the denigrated 'other' of the sacred, the everyday and ordinary. The task 
of understanding this reahn, its possibilities for subjectivity, its relationship to divinity, 
would not only enflesh the profane; it would also constitute a critique of religion as 
only ever belonging to the sacred. The ftrst task is to speak into the silence that is the 
profane. Strategizing around this, Erickson argues in line with de Certeau and Boff 
(1993: 188) that our capacity to appreciate the profane depends upon the development 
of a language that can talk about the subject matter. Popular religion and magic-
characteristically inhabiting the profane - require a language with which to articulate 
the spiritual experiences of oppressed and marginalised peoples. It might be that 
"profane spirituality", in the form of folk religion and magic, incorporates values 
which feminism holds dear: co-operation, ecological sustainability, equality, mutuality, 
embodiment (Erickson, 1993:192). A second strategy is to look to the imaginary 
symbolic of profane life - in art, poetry and music - for expression of ethics and 
values. In this analysis, spiritual feminisms, Goddess spiritualities, neo-paganism, 
and many New Age practices would constitute the reahn of the profane- the religion 
of the masses - where articulations of the conditions and experience of oppression 
would emanate. Indeed, casting feminist spirituality as oppositional to a hegemonic 
masculinised sacred has been a central concern for feminist scholars in religion.5 
Post-modernity can also be characterized as a return or revitalisation of magical and 
mystical based forms of knowing, as opposed to the rationalized theologies of 
modernity. But whether the practices that are emerging -loosely identified as New 
Age- constitute a new 'sacred' is not clear. 
In another sense though, a reclaimation of the profane could be construed as a 
dangerous act as it leaves the masculinised sacred in tact- and in power. The feminist 
philosophers Luce Irigaray and Grace Jantzen take a different pathway to Erickson 
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and focus their attention on the sacred and how its absolutizing, dualistic hold can be 
undone and transformed. They recognize a need to unravel the oppositionalism which 
underpins and encourages the violence that is necessary in the maintenance of the 
sacred/profane. Like Erickson, Irigaray proposes the development of a ' multifaceted 
strategy of eliciting women's voices, listening for the silences, the lacunae, the sounds 
of the margins, listening not just to fathers and sons but to·mothers and daughters.' 
(Jantzen, 1998:193) However, unlike Erickson this process is centred around new 
visions, new arrangements, of the sacred. It can be initiated by what Jantzen, drawing 
on Irigaray calls 'a new feminist imaginary' which has as its aim, 'disrupting the 
symbolic and its powers, by displacing its masculinist structures with a new imaginary, 
new ways of conceiving and being might emerge which enable women to be subjects 
as women' (1998:12). A central process of this new symbolic is the work of women 
imagining themselves into divinity and therefore authentic subjectivity. 
Jantzen (1998:9-12) argues that because religion has been so fundamental to 
the conceptual systems of the West, it is of paramount importance to disrupt the 
religious symbolic. The nature of this disruption is the work of feminist imaginaries 
of divinity where a new idea of God, provides a horizon for 'becoming'. Although 
women are often religious, the religions of the West with their male god's offer no 
way for women to achieve subjectivity in relation to a divine horizon. Jantzen interprets 
Irigaray as saying: 
... "woman needs a god who is a figure for the perfection of her subjectivity". 
The masculinist religious symbolic must be disrupted and space made for the 
female divine. "This god, are we capable of imagining it as a woman? Can we 
dimly see it as the perfection of our subjectivity?" Irigaray signals to the task of 
'subverting the masculinist religious symbolic in every theological doctrine and 
practice, and developing a feminist imaginary of the divine to enable women's 
becoming.' (Jantzen, 1997:198-9). 
What is being proposed here- that women must search for and achieve a specific 
life-afftrming subjectivity according to "self potentiality" (which equals divine-ness) 
-locates religion and the sacred in a different reahn to Erickson's folk religions and 
magicalism. For Irigaray and Jantzen, this would constitute a reversal of relations in 
the sacred-profane dualism, not a transformation of it. However, I do think that 
Erickson's argument that magical and folk religions provide an important pathway 
towards understanding how the masculinised sacred has been resisted, has been clearly 
visible in women's strategic responses to and embracing of, new age spiritualities. 
But her conclusion (1993:196-198) that true liberation- and subjectivity- will only 
come when gender (and other forms of social division) is dismantled, remains 
problematic especially in relation to Irigaray's assertion that sexuality is not just a 
social construction but an essential element of humanity. The Irigarian task is to 
work towards a new ethics of sexual difference that can sustain difference as productive 
and life afftrming and as the site where identity and sacrality is produced. Is this task 
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visible in the myriad ways in which women are currently engaged in religious action? 
Conclusion: postmodern re-castings ofthe sacred 
... we still do not lUlderstand sufficiently what it mean to "sacralize women's 
experience", to call women "sacred", to name certain activities as women's 
"sacred rituals" (Erickson xii) 
Feminist endeavours in the project ofre-imagining the sacred are premised on 
the idea that religion, as Durkheim asserted over one hundred years ago, is a 
foundational structure of human experience, and is elemental in the constitution of 
subjectivity. As argued above, feminist responses to the reality of a masculinized 
sacred vary, but there appears to be no disagreement about the integrity of the existence 
of the sacred as constitutive of religious/spiritual experience. 
In general, contemporary responses can be understood as reflective of a feminist 
religious imaginary whose aim is to enflesh the realm of an alternative cosmology 
which provides the conditions in which women might negotiate agency through the 
articulation of a feminine symbolic. There are multiple sites from which to locate the 
beginnings of this biophillic re-imagination. They are sites that are not owned or 
complete: indeed they are very much 'under construction', and their consummate 
shape and potentiality have yet to be appreciated. They are clearly intertwined with 
other projects and ideas, but certainly express a desire and drive for representations 
of a feminine divine. They include philosophical reflections in language/metaphor; 
feminist art; re-casting the hagiography of [holy] women; feminist inspired ritual and 
spiritual practice. The challenge facing feminist accounts of the sacred is to be able to 
account for women's religious agency in the particular forms in which it is emerging. 
This requires analyzing religion in post modem, or des-secularising, conditions. 
We can read the emergence of alternative feminist spiritual practices as evidence 
of both a collective desire for a re-enchantment of the world, and other ways of 
knowing (about self, body and community) that are not so wholly tied to the discourses 
of scientific rationalism. New Age practices are however deeply embedded in forms 
of capitalist consumerism and individualism, which may inhibit the emergence of 
new ethics governing relations between self and other, and spiritualities that do not 
appropriate and exploit other cultural traditions. 
Many forms of spiritual feminism have 'post-modem' qualities. They do not 
seek to establish doctrines, rules or exclusive texts; their communities are not 
hierarchically based; and they do not evangelise (Gross, 1996; Hume, 1997). They 
are skeptical of large-scale organisational structures and their aim is to enfranchise 
women religiously, by exploring and ritualising female representations of the divine 
- which have been so repressed by monotheistic religions. Women meet in small 
groups, at larger ritual events and at festivals. They utilize different forms of 
technology, and the internet has been a major form of communication and information. 
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Communities are generally small and locally based, and centred around ritual practices 
(Northup, 1997). Value systems include power sharing, ecological awareness and 
political action (Starhawk, 1979). Magic may or may not be used as a technology of 
religious experience, depending on the group's religious orientation. For example, 
some groups may be tied to particular religious traditions and utilize the language 
and ritual life of such traditions (Beecher, 1999). Other groups may be more explorative 
and less tied to particular traditions. Diversity is a key word. Without doubt, a function 
of these groups is tore-imagine the realm of the sacred and to re-connect that to the 
ordinary everyday world in which women live. In this sense, such groups are also re-
writing the boundaries between the sacred and the profane andre-situating the location 
of the ordinary to the sacred Other. 
But the function of ritual is not only tore-imagine the symbolic realm, it is also 
to generate ethics and laws. Dianne Bell's work with central Australian Aboriginal 
women demonstrates that the sexual segregation around ritual practice is not 
necessarily founded on the sacred/profane, rather it is concerned with the system of 
rights and responsibilities within separate domains where sex forms the basis for a 
productive social division (Bell, 1993:248). Within the separate terrain's, there may 
well be sacred/profane distinctions, but the nature of male-female relations is (as 
Durkheim suggested) the right ordering of social (and sexual) relations through ritual 
practice: 
It was in ritual that I found men and women clearly stating their own perceptions 
of their role, their relationship to the opposite sex and their relation to the _ 
Dreamtirne whence all legitimate authority and power once flowed. (Bell, 1993: 
248) 
Feminist anthropologists working in other cultural sites confirm Bell's analysis 
that women's rituals are devalued by western conceptions of gender, and acknowledge 
a complex politics where the cause of women's devaluation is certainly related to the 
impact of colonisation and modernity (Seremetkais, 1991: Marcus, 1992). Indeed 
Seremetakis (1991) argues, in her ethnography of women's mourning rituals in the 
small Peloponnese state of Inner Mani, that it is the fragmenting politics of modernity 
that render women's rituals (and women's religious agency) into displaced (capitalist 
driven), marginalised spheres. Although there is potential for these spheres to generate 
strategies and techniques of resistance (Seremetakis, 1991:1 ), there is little doubt 
that: 
The penetration of modernization ideologies aggravated and intensified culturally 
constructed gender divisions that have been in place for some time (Seremetakis, 
1991:221) 
For Seremetakis (1991:1) it is the 'poetics of the cultural periphery' that provide 
a framework of analysis where a reconstitution of women's religious agency acts 
against the universalising impact of modernity by documenting the historical 
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conditions of cultural peripheries and their relationship to global forces. Women's 
ritual on the margins of the so-called centre does not necessarily indicate dependence 
to that centre 'for it is capable of denying recognition to any centre' (1991:1). Yet 
there is no doubt that to 'stand in the margin is to look through it at other margins and 
at the so-called centre itself' (1991: 1). 
The power of the margin or periphery to generate a resistive politics is not new 
in feminist theory and has been particularly effective in post colonial accounts of 
women's agency as well as in re-imagining women's bodies outside of pollution/ 
purity dichotomies (Douglas, 1966; Joseph, 1990). Marginality might also operate as 
a significant (spatial) site for the development of alternative/radical ideas of sacrality. 
There is no doubt that it is a powerful metaphor in describing the conditions in which 
women are religious agents, but as Erickson reminds us, it is also a dangerous location 
if it continues to leave in tact, the dominant representations of religiosity and 
particularly the sacred. If post-modernity exemplifies processes of de-secularisation, 
the challenge for feminist social theorists is to describe and analyse the conditions in 
which women seek religious agency, and the new transgressive forms that the sacred 
takes in specific cultural locations. 
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Endnotes 
1 Biophillia is a term derived from the work of radical feminist scholar Mary Daly and taken up 
by various feminist theorists. I am using it in the sense that Melissa Raphael (1996) does so: to 
refer to social, cultural and spiritual processes, actions and ideas that are life affmning and 
contribute to the production of a new feminist religious imaginary. 
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2 For example, the work of Rene Girard, Gil Bailie, Jacques Derrida. 
3 In Australian cultural theory, the importance of understanding the production of the sacred, is 
taken up by Gelder and Jacobs (1999) and David Tacey (2000). 
4 Max Weber also makes this point in The Sociology of Religion but suggests that magic is 
characteristic of pre-modem, pre-rationalist societies, and religion of cultures which 
institutionalize or routinize religion. 
5 See in particular the work of Carol Christ and Judith Plaskow (1979) and collected works of 
Starhawk. 
